RAND's Bruce Hoffman on the Implications of a Post-9/11 World

From Foresight, Vol. 9, No. 3
published 2002

Editor's Note: In the following September 2002 interview with the online learning provider, Fathom www.fathom.com, the RAND Corporation’s Bruce Hoffman discusses the changing perceptions of terrorism in the year following September 11, 2001, and the importance of multidisciplinary, independent research in identifying long-term strategies to counter and prevent future threats.

Hoffman, who will be a featured speaker at the Center’s November 21, 2002, conference in Owensboro, is Vice President for External Affairs and Director of The RAND Corporation Washington, D.C., office. A widely recognized expert in international terrorism, Hoffman holds degrees in government, history, and international relations, and a doctorate from Oxford. A frequently featured commentator on CNN, NPR, and the Lehrer NewsHour, The New York Times Book Review cites Hoffman’s latest book, Inside Terrorism, as essential reading for those who want to understand how best to respond to threats of terrorism.

FATHOM: Between 1968 and September 11, 2001, terrorists, either in the United States or abroad, had killed no more than 1,000 Americans.  In the year since September 11, where the death toll was more than 3,000 people, how have perceptions of terrorism changed?

BRUCE HOFFMAN: The most important change is that before September 11, the U.S. somehow believed that it could remain immune to the violence and contentious political currents that were developing around the world and indeed challenging existing orders. Even after the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, in which 6 people were killed and more than 1,000 injured, Americans still believed that they could somehow hermetically seal themselves off from these threats. Following the 1995 bombing of the Murrah federal office building in Oklahoma City, when the U.S. government realized that its adversaries were as much homegrown as foreign, the American public still persisted in believing that terrorism was a problem that happened somewhere else. Terrorist threats were viewed as isolated incidents, or random occurrences that only indirectly affected unsuspecting travelers or Americans in the military or diplomatic corps or stationed abroad, and that was not something we had to worry about occurring in this country.

One of the lessons learned from the September 11 attacks is that we cannot participate in and enjoy the advantages of an increasingly globalized and interconnected world and economy while isolating ourselves and our citizens from the enemies of this system. In retrospect, all of these events may have signaled the beginning of a protracted struggle against the globalized modern world system, and, more specifically, the United States.

FATHOM: What are the defining characteristics of 21st century terrorist activities, and how will international agencies and countries find ways to counter these forms of terrorism?

HOFFMAN: Interestingly, in the 1990s we saw that on the one hand the total volume of international terrorist activity actually declined. But at the same time—although terrorists may have been less active—what we had found is that when terrorists did act they tended to be more violent and more lethal. This had enormous implications for future tactics and targeting that we perhaps did not fully appreciate until September 11th.

Throughout that decade, the percentage of people killed in terrorist operations steadily increased. I think that is a reflection of the re-emergence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative, where the justifications and the legitimatization of violence are different from secular terrorism, and where terrorists therefore have less compunction to engage in acts that tragically involve the deaths of more people.

One of the defining characteristics of conflict in the 21st century is its reach and profound effects on a global audience. In terms of American security, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks showed us that security in the 21st century is going to be very different from 20th-century security, where geographic distance from, and insulation provided by, surrounding oceans somehow enabled the U.S. to remain apart from the maelstrom of conflict in Europe during the early part of the century and then in the Middle East and Asia in the latter part of the century.

The September 11 terrorist attacks underscored for authorities how countering terrorism is not exclusively a local, regional, or international problem, but requires a synergy across all three geographical dimensions because of the open movement of people, goods, and money across borders.

To successfully prevent and counter terrorist activities, authorities must now find ways to work together effectively and dynamically. In this globalized environment, no country can realistically hope to insulate or seal itself off from the threat of terrorism. The most effective means of countering the transnational terrorist threats we are confronted with today is through close cooperation among countries. International efforts to counter terrorism will have to be coordinated particularly to preempt and interdict the flow of resources and logistical support that fuels terrorism today.

FATHOM: What was unique about the tools used in the September 11 terrorist attacks?

HOFFMAN: The advent of what is considered modern, international terrorism occurred on July 22, 1968, when three armed Palestinian terrorists, belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), one of the six groups then comprising the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. While airplane hijackings have long been a preferred terrorist tactic, one that ushered in this period of modern, international terrorism, the September 11 terrorist attacks were different. What was unique was that the terrorists used this old, long-preferred terrorist tactic, thought about the ways authorities typically respond to hijackings, and utilized the predicted response to identify and then exploit what proved to be an inherent weakness in the air security systems.

The authorities had thought through their responses to airplanes terrorized by bombs, for example, secreted in luggage or hijacked by terrorists for ransom or for some coerced agreement. But they just didn’t contemplate that an airplane full of people and fuel would be used as human bomb or missile, hurtling toward a tall building.

Terrorists live to identify and then exploit vulnerability. By using conventional weapons in a unique way, by successfully evading what they knew to be the predicted response from the authorities, the terrorists were able to expose a fatal weakness in our security systems.

HOFFMAN: The unfortunate legacy of the October 2001 anthrax exposures is that terrorists do not necessarily have to kill thousands to make their targets feel at risk, provided they are using exotic or unique enough weapons.

The widespread fear of anthrax contamination was achieved because of the weapon’s vicarious quality—meaning that the attacks were not necessarily confined to one particular target or location but had the potential to radiate outwards through infectious agents or public trafficking of the mail.

Prior to the 2001 anthrax exposures, counterterrorism authorities had thought a lot about bioterrorism—the use of biological agents in terrorist activities—but authorities were still completely stunned by the ease with which terrorists were able to send these agents through the mail and the resulting impact those activities had. We had difficulties responding to and containing those threats, as demonstrated by the fact that the Hart Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C., remained contaminated and closed down for more than four months after an anthrax-laced letter was delivered to U.S. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle’s office. Not to mention the long closures at several major postal mail sorting stations. The unanticipated challenges faced in decontaminating these sites, and the time that it has taken to do so, illustrates that there is still a lot of work to be done to improve our preparedness and response to bioterrorist attack.

HOFFMAN: In my opinion, this is one of the most unfortunate legacies of September 11. One sees heightened security, no matter what the level—whether it’s the federal, state or local government, private industries and businesses or ordinary commercial institutions, such as shopping malls. All of these groups are far more concerned with security now, and rightly so, than they were before September 11. But this comes at a cost.

It is hard not to think of how much money could have been spent on searching for the cure for cancer, for other medical interventions, for improving any given country’s educational systems, or for other worldwide socio-economic development activities. Instead these funds are being siphoned away and spent on improved physical security measures, more guards, and new technologies because of the tragedy of September 11 and the desire to counter and obviate the threat of future tragedies.

HOFFMAN: Academic institutions, as well as think tanks and policy research organizations, have an enormously important role to play in the fight against terrorism—perhaps an even more important role to play today and in the future than they ever had in the past.

In many instances the government has to contend with threats and challenges that have to be answered that same day—which because of their gravity, have to be addressed immediately. This deprives them of the opportunity to take a longer view of threats they might have to face in the future but that they can begin to prepare for today. The unrelenting crush of daily events and priorities can also deprive authorities of the time needed to study and prepare to counter emerging threats, to address the causes and motivations behind these threats and possibly identify future problems that could be addressed before they manifest themselves in terrorist violence. In other words, if you are consumed on a daily basis with the threat du jour—with legitimate, genuine threats—it is very hard to think about what tomorrow’s threat is going to be.

Certainly, the expertise from academic institutions, research organizations and think tanks, such as RAND, are valuable to governments because of their long-range research capabilities. These educational organizations are also useful in informing counterterrorism strategies because academic institutions are ideally equipped to provide the multidisciplinary responses needed to address a phenomenon that erupts, surfaces and flourishes often because of an idiosyncratic combination of factors—historical, economic, religious, cultural, geographical, and so on. Universities, think tanks, and other policy research institutions are very adept at putting together teams of researchers from diverse backgrounds with different approaches that are capable of coming up with new and fresh ideas.

Especially as governments around the world struggle to secure and protect society to an extent that they haven’t necessarily anticipated in the past, educational institutions have an enormously important role in providing independent, objective analysis and advice. Whether it’s in assisting in the identification of best practices, whether it’s independently evaluating new and emerging technologies and policies, or whether it’s helping to identify future trends and future threats, academic institutions, think tanks, and policy research organizations are very well poised to contribute on an active basis.